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JOHN J. McMAHON, Petitioner, v. STATE BAR OF 
CALIFORNIA, Respondent. 
[1a, 1b] Attorneys-Disciplinary Proceedings-Professional Mis-
conduct.-Attorney's conduct in causing allegation of in-
testacy to be prepared and presented to probate court is an 
infraction of the rules of professional conduct (State Bar 
Act, §§ 6067, 6068, 6103, 6106), where he had previously been 
informed of the execution of a will and of the name of the 
attorney who prepared it and who had a copy in his files, had 
knowledge of the general contents of the will, knew the person 
who had been given original possession thereof, relied on 
information that the special administrator and an attorney 
connected with decedent's family did not know of the existence 
of a will after searching for one, and made no effort to ascer-
tain the existence of the will by inquiry of the one in whose 
possession it had been placed. 
[2] Wills-Testamentary Writings.-Even though the dispositive 
provisions of a will may be invalid, as where it fails to provide 
for a person later determined to be a pretermitted heir, the 
will is operative if it merely appoints an executor, and is 
entitled to probate for purposes of administration of the estate. 
[3] Attorneys-Disciplinary Proceedings-Defenses.-Attorney's 
conduct in withholding from court what knowledge he had 
concerning the execution of a will when he presented a petition 
alleging intestacy is not justified by the fact that he had no 
self-serving motive in withholding such information, but was 
primarily interested in getting his client, decedent's brother, 
appointed special administrator before a sister who had been 
named executrix in the will could obtain possession of the 
assets of the estate, because in prior litigation involving the 
estate of another sister such brother, also appointed special 
administrator of such estate, had been unable to get possession 
of the assets due to their alleged wrongful appropriation by 
the sister first mentioned. 
[4] Decedents' Estates-Compensation of Attorneys-Extraordi-
nary Services.-Attorneys for special administrators are within 
[1] See Cal.Jur. 10-Yr.Supp. (1949 Rev), Practice of Law, § 43 
et seq. 
[2] See Cal.Jur., Wills, § 186; Am.Jur., Wills, § 27. 
[ 4] See Cal.Jur., Executors and Administrators, § 1051; Am.Jur., 
Executors and Administrators, §§ 517, 545 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 5] Attorneys, § 136; [2] Wills, § 199; 
[3] Attorneys, § 151; [ 4] Decedents' Estates, § 852. 
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the purview of Prob. Code, § 910, declaring that attorneys for 
executors and administrators may be allowed as fees "such 
further amount as the court may deem just and reasonable 
for extraordinary services." 
[5] Attorneys- Disciplinary Proceedings- Professional Miscon-
duct.-Attorney's conduct in demanding and receiving from 
special administrator fees for extraordinary services without a 
prior court order is not an infraction of the rules of pro-
fessional conduct (State Bar Act, §§ 6067, 6068, 6103, 6106), 
where a large portion of the money so paid to the attorney 
was in turn paid out by him to satisfy legitimate costs incurred 
in the interests of the estate and a pretermitted heir, all 
payments out of the estate were made with the knowledge 
and consent of the pretermitted heir who eventually succeeded 
to the entire estate, the amount received by the attorney for 
his own use was not unreasonable compensation for the amount 
of legal services rendered by him, he was advised by other 
attorneys that his demand and acceptance of such fees were 
legally proper, and other circumstances sustain an inference 
of good faith on his part. 
PROCEEDING to review a recommendation of suspension 
of an attorney for six months. Petitioner suspended for 60 days. 
John J. McMahon, in pro. per., John F. Poole and R. Milton 
Smith for Petitioner. 
Jerold E. Weil, Byron 0. Smith and Albert E. Wheatcroft 
for Respondent. 
'l'HE COURT-The petitioner, John J. McMahon, seeks 
a review of a recommendation of the Board of Governors 
of the State Bar that he be suspended from the practice of the 
law for a period of six months. The Board of Governors 
adopted and approved findings of fact of a Local Adminis-
trative Committee. 
The facts underlying the recommendation are as follows: 
One Rae S. Merrill died in Arizona in April, 1944, leaving 
property in California. Later in April the petitioner as at-
torney for Fred B. Merrill, a brother of the decedent, in-
stituted proceedings for the administration of the estate, 
resulting in the appointment of Fred as special administrator. 
The petition for special letters of administration alleged on 
information and belief that the decedent had died intestate. 
The Local Administrative Committee and the Board of Gover-
nors found that the petitioner herein, who had prepared 
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but not signed the petition .for special letters of administra-
tion, knew that a will had theretofore been executed and that 
he knew its contents including the identity of the beneficiaries 
and the executrix named therein, although he did not know 
it was actually in existence at the time of the decedent's 
death. The Board of Governors further found that the peti-
tioner had information indicating that the allegations of 
intestacy on information and belief were not justified. This 
alleged infraction of the rules of professional conduct con-
stitutes the basis of Count One of the charges piaced against 
the petitioner. 
Count Two charges that the petitioner had embarked upon 
a program of harassment consisting of a series of proceed-
ings instituted to delay the appointment of the named execu-
trix under the will of the decedent. Both the Local .Admin-
istrative Committee and the Board of Governors found that 
the petitioner had not engaged in such a program, and this 
charge is not now urged by respondent. 
Petitioner's client was removed as special administrator 
on October 18, 1945, and the named executrix was granted 
letters testamentary the following day. Count Three alleges, 
and the Local .Administrative Committee and the Board of 
Governors found, that during the time that he was acting 
as attorney for the administrator the petitioner demanded 
and received payment from his client out of funds belonging 
to the estate sums totalling approximately $4,059.40 for extra-
ordinary legal services and costs. The total assets of the 
estate amounted to the sum of $7,199.90. The findings recite 
that these payments were demanded and received "in bad 
faith" by the petitioner and without request for an order of 
the court or approval by the court, except as to the sum of 
$33.10, for which an order was obtained. 
Two questions are presented: (1) Did the petitioner have 
sufficient information concerning the existence of a will which 
should forbid the allegations of intestacy which he caused to 
be presented to the court; and (2) did the petitioner exercise 
bad faith in demanding and accepting fees for extraordinary 
services without a prior order of the court? 
If either or both of these inquiries are answered in the 
affirmative this disciplinary proceeding was justified. (State 
Bar .Act, §§ 6067, 6068, 6103 and 6106.) 
The petitioner contends that he has committed no infrac-
tion of the professional rules of conduct and that the facts 
do not support the findings and recommendations. 
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[la] There is credible evidence that prior to the time of 
the filing of the petition for special letters of administration 
the petitioner had been informed of the execution of the will 
"a year or so before" by the decedent; that he was informed 
of the name of the attor:ney who had prepared the will and 
who had a copy in his files; that he had knowledge of the 
general contents of the will and that he knew of the person 
who had been given original possession of the will. The peti-
tioner admits knowledge of the existence of a copy of the 
will but asserts a belief claimed to be reasonable that the will 
was no longer in existence ; or that if it were it could not be 
probated as the testator was incompetent at the time of its 
execution; or that in any event the will was invalid and in-
operative due to the claim of a pretermitted heir who would 
take as sole heir. 
The petitioner had no affirmative knowledge of the de-
struction of the will. He relied on information that the special 
administrator and an attorney connected with the decedent's 
family did not know of the existence of a will after spending 
two hours in a search for one. He made no effort to ascertain 
the existence of the original will by inquiry of the one in 
whose possession it had been placed. The petitioner's insist-
ence that he did not affirmatively know of the will avoids the 
fact that he had actual notice that one had been executed. 
He asserts that the only evidence of notice on his part of the 
existence of the will is the testimony of the complaining wit-
ness, the special administrator, and that this witness had been 
impeached. However, the petitioner's own testimony reveals 
that he relied upon knowledge that the will did not provide 
for a pretermitted heir in seeking to justify his conduct and 
he admits that he "knew of a copy of a will." He is not 
charged with knowledge of a will, but that he was "possessed 
of such information as should have placed him on inquiry 
as to the existence of a will . . . " It was charged that he 
caused to be filed the petition for special letters in which 
it was alleged under oath: ''That due search and inquiry had 
been made to ascertain if said deceased left any will and 
testament, but none has been found, and according to the 
best knowledge, information and belief of your petitioner, 
said deceased died intestate." 
[2] The petitioner's contention that he could ignore the 
will due to its failure to provide for a person later determined 
to be a pertermitted heir, cannot be sustained. Even though 
the dispositive provisions of a will may be invalid the will 
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is operative if it' merely appoints an executor, and is entitled 
to probate for purposes of administration of the estate. 
(In re Hickman, 101 Cal. 609, 613 [36 P. 118] ; Estate of 
Philippi, 71 Cal..App.2d 127 [161 P.2d 1006].) 
[3] The petitioner contends that he had no self-serving 
motive in withholding such knowledge as he had. His argu-
ment is, and the record reveals, that he was primarily in-
terested in getting his client Fred Merrill appointed special 
administrator before Helen Hillin could obtain possession of 
the assets of the estate. Helen Hillin is a sister of Fred. She 
was also a sister of the decedent and had been named execu-
trix in the will of which the petitioner had notice. Mrs. Hillin 
had gone to Arizona to attend the funeral of the decedent and 
was expected back shortly. It was in her possession that the 
will was reputed to have been placed. In prior litigation Fred 
had been appointed special administrator of the estate of 
Blanche Merrill, another sister, and had been unable to get 
possession of the assets of that estate due to the alleged wrong-
ful appropriation of those assets by Helen Hillin. The peti-
tioner contends that the prior conduct of Mrs. Hillin showed 
that she was an improper person to administer the estate of 
the decedent; that he procured the appointment of Fred 
Merrill as special administrator in order to protect the in-
terests of the pretermitted heir; that the appointment of 
Fred facilitated proceedings in a pending action in which 
the petitioner was seeking to partition property jointly held 
by members of the Merrill family, and that it permitted Fred 
as administrator of the estate of the decedent to be made co-
plaintiff with Fred personally. Prior to this time the peti-
tioner, who represented Fred in the partition suit against 
the other three then-living members of the family, had been 
unable to obtain service on the decedent who had been named 
as a defendant. 
The foregoing considerations cannot serve as justification 
on the part of the petitioner for withholding from the court 
what knowledge he had concerning the existence of a wilL 
[lb] In causing the allegation of intestacy to be alleged 
and presented to the court, he was, therefore, guilty of con-
duct denounced by the statute, and the first question must be 
answered in the affirmative. 
Count Three in effect charg·es that the petitioner unjustifi-
ably demanded and received from the special administrator 
fees for extraordinary services without a prior court order. 
[4] Section 910, Probate Code, provides in part as follows: 
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''Attorneys for executors and administrators shall be al-
lowed out of the estate, as fees . . . such further amount as 
the court may deem just and reasonable for extraordinary 
services.'' 
Attorneys for special administrators are within the pur-
view of the statute. (Estate of Kafitz, 51 Cal.App. 325, 330 
[196 P. 790] .) [5] The petitioner did not seek or obtain 
an order of court authorizing the payment of the fees to him. 
He urges as justification that the amounts thereof were agreed 
upon by the special administrator and that he had an arrange-
ment with the pertermitted and sole heir of the decedent for 
such payments. It is true that a large portion of the money 
so paid to the petitioner was in turn paid out by him to satisfy 
legitimate costs incurred in the interests of the estate and the 
pretermitted heir. It is also true, according to the record 
herein, that all payments out of the estate were made with 
the knowledge and consent of the pretermitted heir who event-
ually succeeded to the entire estate. However, she later brought 
an action against the petitioner and the special administra-
tor jointly for misappropriation of funds and was success-
ful in obtaining a judgment for the return to the estate of 
the sum of $3,750. The petitioner was not served in that action 
and the judgment was satisfied by the special administrator 
by payment out of his own funds. Thereafter the special 
administrator was instrumental in causing the present dis-
ciplinary proceedings to be brought. 
The petitioner is not charged with receiving exorbitant 
fees. Certain it is, from the record, that whatever he received 
for his own use was not unreasonable compensation for the 
great amount of legal services rendered by him in good faith 
on behalf of the estate in a long series of legal actions and 
proceedings. 
The petitioner urges, as further justification, that he con-
sulted and was advised by other attorneys that his demand 
and acceptance of such fees were legally proper and that if 
he honestly believed that he was entitled to extraordinary 
fees without an order of court he should not be found 
guilty of bad faith in obtaining them. He relies upon the 
Estate of Lankershim, 6 Cal.2d 568, 571 [58 P.2d 1282], 
as authority for the proposition that an attorney may demand 
and receive fees for extraordinary services with the consent 
of all interested parties and without an order of court. In 
that case the court affirmed an allowance of fees in the fol-
lowing language: " ... [T]he trial court found and fixed 
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the amount of attorney's fees to be allowed Mr. Mc-
Donald in the sum of $56,443.15, minus the sum of $10,000 
which had been paid him on account of such fees prior to the 
filing of the accounts." No other re:ference is made in the 
opinion to the $10,000. 
The petitioner says he also relied upon other authority. 
He cites 2 Bancroft Probate, page 831, section 444, where it 
is stated: "An executor or administrator, having funds of 
the estate in his possession, unquestionably has the physical 
power to pay funds to his attorney for services rendered by 
the latter ... Moreover, ... though he has made such pay-
ment with funds of the estate and without authority of the 
court ... the attorney cannot be compelled to disgorge, the 
matter being wholly between the representative and the 
estate." He also refers to 33 Corpus Juris Secundum where 
it is said at page 1214 (citing Ludwig V. s~lperior Court, 217 
Cal. 499 [ 19 P .2d 984], as supporting authority) : "A repre-
sentative need not secure permission of the court before 
employing counsel, nor need he secure judicial approval be-
fore paying counsel fees. He proceeds at his own risk, how-
ever, if he does not first obtain such approval." The peti-
tioner urges that a sole heir may, under the law, deal with the 
property of an estate without administration and that the 
transactions, as to the heir, become final, citing Phelps v. 
Grady, 168 Cal. 73 [141 P. 926], and In re Welch, 110 Cal. 
605 [ 42 P. 1089]. Whether the authorities relied upon by the 
petitioner sustain his position need not be and is not de-
cided. It is enough to say that all of the circumstances here 
presented and considered are sufficient to rebut the inference 
of bad faith and to sustain the inference of good faith to which 
the petitioner is entitled under our statute. (Code of Civ. 
Proc., § 1963, subds. 1, 19, 33.) 
It is concluded that the petitioner, as charged in Count 
One of the notice to .show cause, and as found by the Board 
of Governors, had such information concerning the exist-
ence of a will of the decedent that he was not justified in 
representing to the court that the decedent had died intes-
tate; that the charge of "harassment" contained in Count 
Two of the notice to show cause should be dismissed; that 
the charge of "bad faith" on the part of the petitioner in 
accepting the payment of fees for extraordinary services 
prior to an order of the court, as charged in Count Three, 
is not sustained by the evidence and should be dismissed. 
In view of the fact that Counts 'l'wo and 'fhree should be dis-
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missed, we conclude that the ends of justice will best be 
served by fixing 60 days as the time of suspension. 
It is therefore ordered that Counts Two and Three of the 
notice to show cause be, and the same are hereby, dismissed. 
As to Count One it is ordered that the petitioner be suspended 
from the practice of law in this state for the period of 60 
days after this order becomes final. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
In my opinion the evidence is insufficient to show any mis-
conduct on the part of petitioner or that he violated the rules 
of professional conduct of the State Bar of California in any 
respect, and I would, therefore, dismiss the entire proceed-
ing against him. 
Petitioner's application for a rehearing was denied August 
28, 1952. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition 
should be granted. 
[S. F. No. 18478. In Bank. July 31, 1952.] 
OVE E. ERICKSEN, Respondent, v. SOUTHERN PACIFIC 
COMPANY (a Corporation), Appellant. 
[1] Master and Servant-Federal Employers' Liability Act-Em-
ployees Within Act.-An employee whose duties are shown to 
have had the effect on interstate commerce set forth in the 
Federal Employers' Liability Act (35 Stats. 65; 45 U.S.C.A. 
§51) is "deemed" to have been employed by a carrier engaged 
in that commerce. 
[2] !d.-Federal Employers' Liability Act-Employees Within 
Act.-Employee eligible to benefits of Federal Employers' 
Liability Act need not be a "railroader" exposed to the risks 
peculiar to railroading, but may be any employee whose duties 
further interstate commerce "or in any way directly or closely 
and substantially" affect such commerce. (45 U.S.C.A. §51.) 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Master and Servant,§ 58; Am.Jur., Master and 
Servant, § 398. 
McK. Dig, References: [1-3] Master and Servant, §202; [4] 
Master and Servant, § 204(6); [5] Master and Servant,§ 204(4); 
[6, 11] Master and Servant, § 203; [7-10] Master and Servant, 
§ 200; [12] Damages, § 100. 
